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1. INTRODUCTION TO RATIONALITY AS VIRTUE 
 
Throughout the modern period, one of the most controversial philosophical 
questions has focused on the nature and entailments of human rationality. This 
question relates to many others about the locus of the ‘objectivity’ of human 
knowledge, that is, about how ordinary beliefs are justified. The view is fairly widely 
established according to which many distinctly modern conceptions of human 
rationality pose considerable challenges when it comes to confirming the rationality 
of faith.
i
  
In response to this threat, theologians and philosophers of religion have tended 
to employ one of two main strategies for bolstering the contention that faith is 
rational.
ii
 The first, defensive, approach involves responding to objections to the faith 
that have been presented by outsiders on any number of grounds: historical, scientific, 
intellectual, and even moral.
iii
 The second approach goes on the offensive for the 
faith. In other words, it endeavors to give a positive account of Christian belief, which 
anticipates and implicitly overturns the accusations of objectors.  
Although both of the two aforementioned strategies are essential to the 
overarching apologetic task, the persuasiveness of the defensive arguments turns on 
the integrity of the positive account of the faith, which those arguments defend. 
Without that preemptive account as a basis, defensive arguments inevitably tend to 
address objections on the implicit assumption that the objections are legitimate, thus 
exposing faith to even more and more devastating critiques.  
The present work will contribute to the positive dimension of the apologetic 
project by delineating a definition of human rationality, which underlines the 
rationality of faith, where prevailing definitions evidently call it into doubt. As part of 
this effort, rationality will be described not merely as an epistemological matter to do 
with the soundness of human thinking. Ultimately, it will be construed as an ethical 
question whether knowledge is utilized in a manner that is consistent with the 
overarching purpose of ‘rational animals’, which is to flourish through the exercise of 
individual abilities and thereby contribute to the flourishing of others. In this regard, 
the argument outlined here might be described as a moral argument for God’s 
existence, though it is in many respects distinct from and involves a good deal more 
than most such arguments, which is arguably essential to their sustainability.
iv
 
In ways on which I will soon elaborate, defining rationality in ethical terms, 
more specifically, in terms of moral virtue, provides an exceptionally effective basis 
for establishing the rationality of faith. For Christian faith can be shown to enact or 
provide a rationale for rationality, defined in these terms, such that faith is already 
rational—and philosophy already theological. As I will demonstrate below, it takes a 
full-scale re-configuration of philosophy in terms of what I call ‘pro-theology 
philosophy’ to obtain a definition of rationality that is both amenable to faith and 
intrinsically more plausible than the definitions that tend to undermine faith. 
By shedding new light through such arguments on the sense in which faith is 
intrinsically rational, the project undertaken here aims to lay the foundation not only 
for defensive apologetic projects but above all for inquiries concerning what it means 
to live by faith and elucidate the articles of faith—proper to the fields of Christian 
Ethics and Systematic Theology, respectively—which proceed on the assumption that 
faith is rational.  
Before outlining the more detailed steps of the argument, however, a brief 
word about sources is in order. In preparing this proposal, I have drawn considerable 
inspiration from numerous pre-modern thinkers, above all, Thomas Aquinas. Because 
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Aquinas for one seems to operate from a theological and philosophical perspective, 
which does not even give rise to the problem of faith’s rationality, at least in its 
modern form, his work represents an especially useful resource for overcoming this 
problem, which urgently demands resolution today.
v
  
Although I follow Aquinas closely on certain matters, the very fact that he 
operated in a context that is so far removed from our own renders it impossible or at 
least unprofitable simply to re-iterate his thought on, say, the nature of reason or of 
faith. Thus, the conceptual framework outlined in this context does not entail a 
reformulation or even interpretation of Aquinas but a constructive effort to resolve the 
current question of faith’s rationality, which appropriates, sometimes quite 
extensively, and adapts, sometimes quite heavily, principles Aquinas articulated, 
insofar as these are still relevant in contemporary circumstances.
vi
  
As hinted above, my treatment of this framework falls into two distinct parts, 
one of which re-defines rationality in ethical terms through the articulation of a ‘pro-
theology philosophy’, and another, which explains how rationality so construed 
gestures towards the rationality of Christian faith, such that a pro-theology philosophy 
turns out to be a theological philosophy.  
While the present work undertakes the first part of the project, the second will 
be the focus of a separate work entitled, Theological Philosophy. Because the two 
distinct works are closely related, I will endeavor in what follows to sketch the 
overarching line of argument they delineate, by summarizing the discussion of each 
book’s chapters. First, however, I will situate this argument in its intellectual context, 
describing some of the main approaches to asserting faith’s rationality that have been 
advocated in modern times. 
 
The Intellectual Context of Theological Philosophy 
 
Throughout the modern period, two main methods of dealing with the problem 
of establishing faith’s rationality have predominated, namely, rationalism and fideism.  
The rationalist approach, commonly espoused by proponents of natural theology, 
turns on several different types of attempt to establish God’s existence on grounds 
accessible to human beings. While cosmological arguments appeal to nature to infer 
the reality of a cause or creator of the world, for example, teleological arguments 
invoke the order of the universe and signs of intelligent design to establish God’s 
existence.
vii
  
In addition to these two types of argument, some, though admittedly fewer, 
have advocated an ontological argument for God’s existence, that is, an argument that 
derives proof for God from the very definition of God and thus from the mere thought 
of him, working from ‘reason alone’ as opposed to invoking the quasi-empirical 
evidence of creation or the natural order.
viii
 By contrast to rationalism, fideism tends 
to trade on the assertion that faith cannot be evidenced or grounded by reason in any 
way but ought to be adhered to all the same.
ix
  
In recent years, many scholars have begun to recognize that neither approach 
to addressing the question of faith’s rationality is entirely adequate to the task. While 
fideism simply evades the question, for example, the natural theological proofs for 
God’s existence mentioned above seem ultimately to beg the question they purport to 
answer, or to assume what they attempt to prove. They do this by taking God’s 
existence as evident to the senses or self-evident to the mind, when clearly God’s 
reality is not evident in these ways to those who deny or disregard it. As numerous 
critics have noted, such proofs usually only have the power to persuade those who 
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already believe in God.
x
 At very least, this suggests that they do not suffice as a main 
line of defensive argument for the existence of God.  
That is not to say that the proofs have no place in Christian thought, however. 
Indeed, they may enrich the faith of believers or even bring unbelievers to faith, 
particularly when employed as tools for forming a habit of viewing the world from 
the perspective of belief in God. As I have argued elsewhere, this perspective checks 
the human tendency to ascribe absolute significance to things other than God and so 
transforms the thoughts and lives of believers into evidence for the difference belief in 
God can make when it comes to dealing with ordinary affairs.
xi
  
Though such a therapeutic or pedagogical interpretation of the theistic proofs 
is arguably more faithful to the intents of the early Christian and medieval writers 
who originally developed them, it admittedly diverges rather widely from the modern 
conception of the arguments, according to which theistic proofs offer direct evidence 
for God’s existence. In fact, it already moves in the general direction of the new 
approach to asserting faith’s rationality that this book contributes to developing.  
In presenting a new way of conceiving faith’s rationality, however, the present 
work is not alone. Recently, a number of other scholars have sought to re-think the 
whole project of proving faith’s rationality, in some cases by going so far as to 
challenge the prevailing standards of rationality that pose problems for faith. For 
instance, proponents of Reformed Epistemology (RE)—including Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, William Alston, and especially Alvin Plantinga—ground their religious 
epistemological agenda on a preliminary reconsideration of the modern ‘evidentialist’ 
or ‘foundationalist’ standard of knowledge. According to this standard, knowledge 
claims must be backed by empirical evidence, such that cosmological and teleological 
proofs provide the sole means to proving the existence of God.
xii
  
In challenging this standard, RE thinkers, particularly Plantinga, appeal to a 
revised version of the ontological argument in order to argue that belief in God is 
‘properly basic’. That is to say, God is intuitively and thus ineluctably known, at least 
to those with the will or desire for God that is generated by God’s own irresistible 
grace. By construing belief in God as properly basic, RE thinkers effectively reverse 
the question whether it is rational to believe in God. In diverse and highly 
sophisticated ways to which this brief description obviously cannot do full justice, 
they seek to render it inconceivable not to know that God exists.  
Although the work of RE scholars represents a remarkable advance in the field 
of religious epistemology, it has met nevertheless with various forms of criticism. 
One of the main lines of contention against proponents of RE is that their approach 
seems suspiciously similar to that of fideism, in that it advocates a sort of groundless 
ground for belief in God, to wit, a properly basic intuition.
xiii
 Though RE thinkers 
themselves have sought ways to exonerate their program of this charge, another has 
been raised, which points out that the RE agenda, if successful, still only establishes 
that there is something like a God, not necessarily the Christian God in whom RE 
figures themselves believe.
xiv
 
A similar charge could incidentally be laid before the natural theologians who 
advocate the other forms of proof for the existence of God mentioned above. While 
cosmological and teleological proofs may validly demonstrate the existence of 
something like a God, they provide no basis for confirming that this God is the 
Christian God or that of any other religious system. Thus, the question remains how 
conceptually to connect theistic proofs of any kind—whether natural theological or 
Reformed Epistemological—with belief in, say, the Triune, Incarnate God of 
Christian faith, as opposed to appending the articles associated with specifically 
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Christian belief at the end of a line of argument for God’s existence.   
In order to compensate for the lack of doctrinal content inherent in theistic 
proofs, certain analytic philosophers with Christian persuasions have recently 
developed a program they call ‘analytic theology’, which endeavors to apply the tools 
and methods of analytic philosophy to elucidating the coherence and rationality of 
theological doctrines.
xv
 In principle, this is a commendable project to which this work 
and its sequel might be seen as contributing, depending on exactly how philosophy is 
used to illuminate the sense in which Christian doctrines are rational, and indeed, how 
the terms ‘philosophy’, ‘rationality’, and ‘doctrine’, are even defined.  
While analytic theologians may eventually succeed in its undertaking, it 
arguably remains the case that their efforts would bring them no closer than analytic 
philosophers of religion to forging a connection between beliefs about the Christian 
God and the object of attempts to establish the rationality of belief in a God of any 
kind. Thus, it would still be necessary for them to append their accounts of the 
intelligibility of Christian doctrinal statements to theistic proofs in a seemingly 
arbitrary way in order to establish that it is the God of Christian belief whose 
existence is under consideration. By contrast, the connection between theistic proof 
and specifically Christian beliefs is integral to theological philosophy. 
In addition to the accounts already mentioned, a number of other promising 
approaches to resolving the question of faith’s rationality have been presented in 
recent years. One account, which is highly congenial to my own, is that of Denys 
Turner in his Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God. In this book, Turner contends 
that reason itself needs to be re-defined in terms that are more compatible with faith 
before the question of the rationality of faith can be resolved. 
As Turner himself states, however, his essay only “clear[s] away a little of the 
clutter of misconception, philosophical and theological, which has for several 
centuries stood in the way of a more theologically positive understanding of 
reason.”xvi In doing this, however, he effectively calls for a more comprehensive 
effort to re-define reason in a manner that is amenable to faith, and to address the 
question of the rationality of faith on that basis, thus anticipating the project I 
undertake here.  
According to another line of argument that has been advanced in recent 
years—by figures as diverse as the philosopher of religion Paul Moser and the 
Christian ethicist, Stanley Hauerwas—the proof for the rationality of faith in God 
ultimately derives from the Christian life, or from the life of the Church.
xvii
 While I 
certainly arrive at a similar conclusion in the last analysis—indeed in the last 
substantial chapter of this book’s sequel—my own argument over the course of two 
books should serve to indicate that a good deal of preliminary philosophical and 
theological work needs to conducted before this compelling conclusion can really 
hold up to scrutiny or even carry much meaning—whether for Christians or non-
Christians—thus providing a fully intellectually satisfactory alternative to, say, 
natural theology. 
This preliminary work would involve re-construing ordinary rationality in 
terms of a certain style of life—that is, a virtuous life—and showing subsequently that 
this life is paradigmatically instanced in or enabled by life in the Church. Such a line 
of reasoning alone seems plausibly to support the claim that the Christian life is the 
proof of faith’s rationality. Yet it is just this line of thinking that is lacking in the work 
of the aforementioned thinkers and particularly that of Hauerwas, who seems to deny 
the very need for it.  
By developing precisely this line of thinking, in contrast, theological 
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philosophy aims to provide a basis for the claim that the Christian life is the proof for 
faith’s rationality. At the same time, it lays the foundation for the efforts of 
theological ethicists to articulate what the Christian life involves and the reasons for 
living it, without which the Christian life and Christian ethics might easily be 
perceived as arbitrary, irrational, or irrelevant to all but Christian believers.  
Although I have acknowledged above the creativity and promise of a variety 
of accounts of faith’s rationality, I have suggested nonetheless that much remains to 
be desired when it comes to affording resources conclusively to overturn the question 
whether it is reasonable to believe in the God of Christian faith.
xviii
 Of course, a single 
work like this one could scarcely overcome completely the skepticism about faith’s 
rationality that has grown recent years. That would depend not only on the plausibility 
and persuasiveness of the work’s argument but also on the will of skeptics to receive 
it. Nevertheless, the present discussion begins to forge a conceptual pathway past the 
problem of faith’s rationality and on to a plane of systematic and moral theological 
inquiry, which presupposes it. In its way of doing this, as outlined below, therefore, it 
provides conceptual resources to those willing to employ them to make slow but 
steady progress towards the victory of faith over doubt. 
 
The Precursor: Pro-Theology Philosophy 
 
The effort the present work undertakes to outline a pro-theology philosophy 
begins in chapter two (‘The Ontology of Participation’) with a discussion of the sub-
discipline of philosophy which deals with the most fundamental area of philosophical 
inquiry, namely, ontology, which describes ‘what there is’ and the way in which it 
exists. In particular, the chapter outlines an ontology of ‘participation’ such as can be 
found in various forms in the work of Thomas Aquinas and other pre-modern 
thinkers. As I understand it, ‘participation’ refers to a being’s engagement in the 
activities or form of existence proper to its specific nature or essence, which is 
acquired at its inception. This essence makes the being one type of thing as opposed 
to another and provides it with a potential to actualize through ongoing participation 
in a certain mode of existence, or life.    
Since the human essence is that of a rational animal—or embodied intellectual 
being—I further describe in this chapter the faculties of perception, imagination, and 
intellect, which allow human beings to actualize their cognitive nature. Subsequent to 
this discussion, I detail the three main areas in which human beings may have an 
aptitude or ‘intellectual virtue’ for exercising rationality. These areas include wisdom, 
which might be understood in terms of the study of theology and philosophy; science, 
which simply concerns the ordered study of any object of inquiry whatever; and 
skilled or craft knowledge, which includes all practical, productive, and creative 
arts.
xix
   
After treating the faculties that enable human beings to acquire knowledge, I 
turn in chapter three (‘The Ontology of Knowledge’) to articulate an ontology of 
knowledge, or an account of the elements or cognitive functions that factor into and 
facilitate the cognitive process. These include concepts, statements, and definitions, 
and inductive and deductive modes of reasoning. In this context, I also consider the 
relationship between language and knowledge, which allows me to account for the 
way and extent to which thought is inevitably shaped by and carried out within 
particular traditions or spatio-temporal contexts.  
In the course of this discussion, I review the various aspects of the Aristotelian 
system of formal logic, which Aquinas implemented as a tool for the expression of his 
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own thought.
xx
 In doing so, however, it might be argued that I overlook the fact that 
traditional logic stemming from Aristotle’s works has largely been replaced in 
contemporary philosophy by modern symbolic logic, especially the predicate 
calculus.
xxi
 The main difference between the two systems is this: while modern 
symbolic logic operates in an entirely hypothetical mode, “traditional logic makes the 
assumption that no term is empty.”xxii That is to say, it presumes that there are real 
instances of all the terms assessed. The advantage of the predicate calculus, many 
would assert, is that it allows deductions to be carried out independently of the 
meaning or content of the propositions involved, thus enabling distinctions to be 
articulated far more precisely than would be otherwise possible. 
In an effort to affirm the fundamentality of modern symbolic logic, certain 
logicians have endeavored to show that the results of the theory of syllogism may be 
obtained in predicate calculus, provided certain existential assumptions are made.
xxiii
  
By these means, they have tried to show that traditional logic is reducible to predicate 
calculus.
xxiv
 Rather than proving that there is a fundamental discrepancy between the 
two systems, however, this effort simply establishes that traditional logic is a sub-set 
of predicate calculus, insofar as it makes assumptions about reality, where predicate 
calculus is also concerned with empty and thus all conceivable terms.
xxv
 
Although predicate calculus may for this very reason successfully enable 
professional philosophers to explore hypothetical questions, its corresponding 
tendency to sever ties with reality renders it rather less suitable for the purposes of the 
present work. One of those purposes is to elucidate the sense in which logic serves as 
a training ground or facilitator for ordinary cognitive efforts that promote “reason’s 
self-government, with respect to one’s own practical choices and those of 
others.”xxvi In other words, the aim of this work is to explain logic in a way that 
illustrates that it ultimately “points beyond itself to a valuable ethical end.”xxvii  
Aristotelian logic is highly compatible with this purpose, precisely because it 
deals primarily with actual realities, which are the concern of ordinary knowing 
agents. By clarifying some difficult aspects of Aristotle’s logic, consequently, this 
chapter sets the stage for chapter four’s effort to illustrate the vital role logic plays in 
the successful execution of the cognitive process. As I will show in later chapters, 
particularly chapter seven, this process through which reason properly governs its 
own operations in turn predisposes the mind effectively to govern the self and its 
relation to others and thus to tailor logic to larger ethical ends. 
On the grounds that human knowledge like all things is subject to 
development, chapter four (‘The Conditions for Knowledge’) demonstrates how the 
ideas whereby humans realize their potential also undergo growth and change. As I 
will elaborate, the dialectical process of intellectual development, facilitated by the 
elements of logic, takes place in three stages, which I will treat in terms of expectant, 
fulfilled, and informed faith. 
One of the main reasons why I appeal to the concept of faith, generically not 
religiously defined, to explain the process of development in knowledge is that it 
testifies to the fact that unknowing, the sub-conscious, or tacit knowledge fuels the 
knowing process.
xxviii
 On another level, the concept of faith bespeaks the goal-
orientation of knowledge, or the fact that we do not start out knowing whatever we 
want to know but set objectives to know which we must strive gradually to fulfill over 
time on the belief that we will eventually do so.  
In this connection, the first phase of expectant faith is characterized by a lack 
of knowledge and a desire to know that motivates us to undertake inquiries that are 
designed to bring about the acquisition of knowledge. That knowledge is achieved in 
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the second phase of fulfilled faith, while the third phase of informed faith involves 
placing confidence in the knowledge obtained in fulfilled faith in order to make sense 
of further experiences.
xxix
 In doing this, we not only add clarity and precision to that 
knowledge but also begin the whole process of moving from expectant to fulfilled to 
informed faith again, such that the search for truth is interminable, and knowledge 
never ceases to be a matter of faith.
xxx
  
Because our thinking is always caught in the throes of expectant, fulfilled, or 
informed faith, it is evidently impossible to capture thoughts about things that are true 
for all persons at all places and at all times, that is, to be objective or rational on one 
common modern definition of the term. Thus, chapter five (‘Rationality’) seeks to 
explain the sense in which human beings engaged in the cognitive process as I 
describe it may be considered rational. To this end, I follow Aquinas in appealing to 
the indispensible role the will plays in collaboration with the intellect at every one of 
the three aforementioned phases of inquiry. The work of this faculty is implied in the 
previous appeal to the concept of faith, which is suggestive of intellectual as well as 
volitional components of cognition, that is, both knowledge and the desire to pursue 
or employ knowledge.  
In expectant faith, for example, the will to account for reality alerts us to the 
fact that there is something important in our experience for which we are unable to 
account, filling us with the desire and motivation to compensate for the deficiency in 
our understanding. Moreover, the will signals when we have achieved the 
understanding we desire, refusing to settle for any solution that fails to satisfy this 
desire. Finally, the will compels us to apply the understanding we have achieved in 
order to make sense of further experiences in informed faith. Without the will moving 
the intellect at all times, in summary, it would be impossible for the intellect to gain 
and grow in understanding. 
In order to uphold the intellect’s commitment to the truth, the will seemingly 
needs a means by which to make contact with the particular realities of experience for 
which the intellect is responsible to account. Aquinas explains the embodied nature of 
human knowing by appealing to the ‘passions’. Whenever we experience our bodies 
or an object in the external world, the passions register the object of experience as 
helpful or inimical with respect to the intellect’s purpose of knowing what is true and 
thereby help the will determine how to direct the intellect towards or away from that 
object.  
As essential as the passions may be when it comes to helping us testify to the 
truth, they can also lead us astray from the truth when we fail to evaluate particular 
objects of knowledge in terms of the larger effort to promote the truth, and instead 
reduce the pursuit of truth to the promotion of one theory or ideology about which we 
are particularly passionate. When we become so preoccupied with one perspective, 
channeling all our passions to promote it, our passions become ‘dis-passions’. For 
they prevent rather than enable the mind to remain receptive to the ongoing discovery 
of truth. They put us out of touch rather than in touch with reality, often leading us to 
fabricate, modify, or block out information to the end of bolstering personal opinions.  
When explaining how to counteract the dis-passions, I appeal to Aquinas’ 
famous discussion of the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance, arguing that these can be construed not merely as moral but also as 
intellectual virtues that rectify the intellect, will, and passions for their purpose of 
pursuing the truth. In this regard, I seek to contribute to recent discussions of what is 
known as ‘virtue epistemology’, that is, the growing field of philosophical inquiry in 
which the success of knowledge is said to turn on various epistemic character 
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qualities such as commitment (i.e. fortitude) or a sense of accountability to the truth 
(i.e. justice).
xxxi
  
In a virtue epistemology inspired by Aquinas, prudence for one can be 
described as the virtue that compels the intellect to seek contact with reality. On my 
account, it allows for this possibility because of the justice of the will, which 
motivates us to testify about reality in a way that does justice to it, inasmuch as it is 
accessible to our knowledge. As I understand it, the collaborative work of prudence 
and justice is sustained by the two further ‘virtues of the passions’, namely, fortitude 
and temperance, which can be counted amongst the intellectual virtues insofar as they 
promote the work of prudence and justice.  
While fortitude plays its part in this regard by giving us the passion or strength 
to overcome challenges to prioritizing truth over personal opinions or agendas, 
temperance fills us with the passions we need to perform the regular work involved in 
pursuing truth, thus preventing us from indulging in passions for pursuits that would 
distract us from this endeavor. To sum up: fortitude and temperance make it possible 
to follow through on the purposes of prudence and justice by teaching us to have the 
courage and discipline to do exactly this.  
As this confirms, the four intellectual virtues together—and only in that 
way—enable us truthfully to testify to our experiences. Although they do not allow us 
to meet the seemingly impossible standard of knowledge according to which our ideas 
must remain perennially true, they do predispose us to revise beliefs we originally 
took to be true whenever new experiences require that we do so. As I will show, these 
revisions are possible—and human beings are rational—because of the work not only 
of the intellect but also of the will and passions and the intellectual virtues of 
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which form them. 
In advancing this argument about the indispensability of the intellect, will, and 
passions to human rationality, some readers might suspect that I endorse the so-called 
‘faculty psychology’ that contemporary philosophers have found so objectionable, but 
which is common amongst pre-modern philosophers including Aquinas and before 
him, Plato and Aristotle. In the iconic critique of faculty psychology developed in The 
Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle contends that the traditional dogma “that the mind is in 
some important sense tripartite, that is, that there are just three ultimate classes of 
mental processes…namely, thought, feeling, and will,” represents “such a welter of 
confusions and false inferences that it is best to give up any attempt to re-fashion it. It 
should be treated as one of the curios of theory.”xxxii 
 As a quasi-behaviorist, Ryle rejects such a faculty psychology on the grounds 
that it supposedly “assumes that there are mental states and processes enjoying one 
sort of existence and bodily states and processes enjoying another [such that] an 
occurrence on the one stage is never numerically identical with an occurrence on the 
other.”xxxiii According to most versions of this myth of what Ryle calls “the Ghost in 
the Machine,”xxxiv overt actions “are the results of counterpart hidden operations”xxxv 
in the secret mental life of the knowing agent. For Ryle, in fact, appeals to the 
intellect, will, and emotions are the prime exemplification or ramification of the 
notion that the mental faculties lead a life of their own, over and above the human acts 
they affect. Thus, they reinforce the insurmountable mind-body dualism, which Ryle 
perceives as intrinsic to faculty psychology and as the most problematic feature 
thereof.  
Since the time Ryle first mounted his critique of faculty psychology, 
numerous philosophers have responded to his arguments in ways that call attention to 
his fundamental misapprehension of the theory to which he so forcefully objected.
xxxvi
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For example, David Braine has stressed that the mental states, such as thinking, 
willing, and feeling, which faculty psychologies postulate, are not real entities in the 
way Ryle seemingly envisaged them. Rather, they represent logical constructions or 
explanatory locutions, the purpose of which is simply to elucidate the psychological 
impetuses behind changes in behavior, without which there could arguably be no 
changes in behavior.
xxxvii
  
Assuming that “any proper account of the mental involves the physical, and 
any proper account of the physical involves the mental,”xxxviii Braine concludes that 
all statements about human acts are or must be ‘hybrid’ statements that recognize both 
cognitive and behavioral components of human action.
xxxix
 Far from indicating the 
existence of three autonomous entities that function on a plane that supersedes that of 
natural life, his account consequently confirms, the language regarding intellect, will 
and passions of which faculty psychologists tend to avail themselves points up the 
constraints of language when it comes to giving an account of something as unified 
and fluid as embodied human action.  
In employing this language, my own treatment of faculty psychology in 
chapter five operates on the assumption that appeals to the intellect, will, and passions 
serve collectively to explain the occurrence of embodied human acts—whether 
intellectual or moral. Rather than implying the existence of irreducibly distinct 
entities that operate over and above the embodied life of the human being on a 
separate, mental, plane of being, references to these faculties are intended to facilitate 
understanding of the conditions that give rise to human actions on the only plane of 
being in question, namely, that of natural life.  
As argued in chapter two, the pursuit of knowledge by way of the three 
aforementioned faculties is our means as human beings to accomplishing the larger 
task of becoming what we are. On this basis, I argue in closing chapter five that our 
cognitive efforts are best undertaken with a view to the larger moral or personal goal 
of self-actualization. By situating our intellectual efforts within the context of this 
greater goal, I submit, we achieve the optimal position from which to utilize our 
knowledge for rational ends, namely, ones that are consistent with rather than inimical 
to our maximal moral or personal development as ‘rational animals’ with skills in the 
areas of wisdom, science, or art. 
On the grounds that moral virtue is the final arbiter or paradigm case of 
intellectual virtue and thus of human rationality, the remaining chapters of this work 
explain how the four cardinal moral virtues enable us to become rational in the fullest 
sense of the term, by cultivating ‘an individual orientation towards the highest good’, 
which is the definition of the moral life, and therefore rationality. 
As a preliminary to this discussion, I explore in chapter six (‘Deficient 
Conditions for Pro-Theology Philosophy’) certain factors that might prevent us from 
fully realizing our personal or moral potential. In this connection, I start by explaining 
that the dis-passions, which sometimes lead us astray in the pursuit of truth, are 
particularly liable to detract from our efforts when it comes to engaging in the moral 
task of self-actualization. They acquire the power thus to render us deficient for our 
human purpose when they lead us to believe that our good or happiness consists in 
goods that are inferior to that of self-actualization. 
In cases where such ‘dispassionate’ tendencies become entrenched, they create 
fixed dispositions whereby we cultivate the worst rather than the best possible 
versions of ourselves, self-destructing rather than self-actualizing. These dispositions 
are what are called vices. In this chapter, I outline the implications of the seven main 
vices that are recognized in the pre-modern Christian tradition and the work of 
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Aquinas, drawing on these sources to construct an account of the way that pride, 
greed, envy, apathy, anger, lust, and gluttony unravel our ability to be and become 
what we are.  
In treating these vices, I call attention to the two extreme forms in which each 
vice may express itself. For example, I show that pride not only manifests in an 
excessive form through arrogance or hubris; it can also emerge in a deficient form, 
namely, false humility. As I further demonstrate, greed may also surface in extremes 
of excess or deficiency, respectively, that is, in an unbridled lust for pleasure or 
privilege, or in a sort of ‘greed for pain’. Moreover, apathy may appear in the guise of 
sheer laziness or lack of ambition, or it may assume the form of extreme busyness and 
preoccupation with pointless activities.  
On my argument, drawing attention to the excessive and deficient forms of 
every vice is absolutely vital to recognizing and thus correcting as opposed to 
exacerbating the vices individuals actually possess. Once this account of the vices is 
elaborated, it should become evident that we need to be informed about the fact that 
self-realization is our highest good, and about that in which self-actualization consists, 
if we are to avoid confusion on account of the passions regarding what it means for us 
to live good lives, and thus to escape the snare of the vices. 
What it means to actualize personal potential, on my understanding, is quite 
simply to ‘bear well’ whatever our intellectual aptitudes, resources, and circumstances 
that are given to us to bear, at any given point in time. Since these may change over 
time and with experience, it follows that we must always remain open to 
reconsidering what it means for us to bear our lives well. By bearing ourselves well in 
the aforementioned respects, we not only realize who we are but also exploit our 
personal skills for the sake of contributing to the well being of others, or the common 
good, in our invariably individualized and finite ways.  
On this showing, consequently, there is no dichotomy between the personal 
goal of striving for our own highest good, which consists in bearing our 
circumstances to the best of our abilities—thus engaging in self-actualization—and 
the aim of realizing our potential to promote the common good. The two goals of 
human and humane being represent two aspects of one phenomenon.
xl
 In closing on 
this note, I set the stage for the last major chapter of the book, which will cover how 
we bear our lives well by cultivating the four cardinal moral virtues of prudence, 
justice, fortitude, and temperance.  
As I explain in chapter seven (‘Sufficient Conditions for Pro-Theology 
Philosophy’), the four cardinal virtues operate in the moral context in ways that are 
recognizable from their work in the intellectual context. For instance, prudence puts 
us in touch with who we are as individuals, helping us accurately to assess our 
intellectual and other abilities, without over or under-estimating them, thus 
predisposing us to make the most of our limited lives, in part through the exercise of 
intellectual virtues. In general, then, prudence teaches us to ‘bear well’ whatever we 
may have to bear in terms of abilities, resources, and circumstances, and thus to strive 
for the highest good in the way we can from within the confines of our individual 
lives.  
In co-operation with prudence, justice enables us to bear ourselves to the best 
of our abilities not only because this maximizes our existence and thus our experience 
of what it means to thrive in the human condition, but also because such self-
actualizing efforts double as the actualization of our potential personally to contribute 
to the good of others, albeit in a limited way. While fortitude further affords the 
courage we need to fight for the highest or common good in the face of obstacles, 
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temperance disciplines us to carry out the daily responsibilities involved in bearing 
our lives well, when it is open to us to be distracted from or neglect these 
responsibilities. In their distinctive ways, consequently, the four cardinal virtues 
collectively enable us to maintain a personal commitment to the highest good, which 
ideally entails the exercise of the intellectual virtues as well.  
In the final section of this chapter, I address a number of questions, which bear 
on the larger question regarding the sense in which moral virtue is the final arbiter of 
human rationality. For instance, I consider the extent to which we can be considered 
virtuous or rational while still in the process of habituating ourselves in virtue. 
Additionally, I inquire about the extent to which we can be regarded as rational if we 
possess only intellectual without moral virtue or moral without intellectual virtue.  
Although I affirm that rationality is possible on some level under both 
circumstances, I conclude by building on the argument of chapter five, according to 
which rationality ideally entails both intellectual and moral virtue, offering reasons to 
support this contention. Where there is a unity of intellectual and moral virtue—or 
better, intellectual for moral virtue, and moral virtue conversely substantiated by 
intellectual virtue, in summary, I identify the paradigm case of human rationality. 
 In chapter eight, I briefly summarize the argument of the book and 
extrapolate some additional conclusions from it. In this connection, I show that the 
process of self-actualization described above doubles as a process of self-discovery, 
provided it is undertaken in a conscious or deliberate manner. Since all our labor to 
bear things well strengthens our sense of personal identity and purpose under these 
conditions, I elaborate, that work in turn facilitates further attempts to engage in self-
actualization. 
As this brief summary of the book’s argument suggests, the effort to re-define 
rationality undertaken here involves a foray into all the main sub-disciplines of 
philosophy: ontology, theory of knowledge, and ethics. On the account I have 
advanced, these sub-disciplines, while distinctive, cannot be treated as altogether 
unrelated to one another, as they often are in contemporary philosophy, because they 
collectively describe and prescribe a functional and fulfilling—or rational—human 
life. While ontology and the theory of knowledge delineate the necessary conditions 
for that life and thus for pro-theology philosophy in that they respectively describe the 
way all things become themselves and the cognitive means through which human 
beings realize their potential, ethics satisfies the sufficient conditions by accounting 
for the way these necessary conditions are ultimately fulfilled in the lives of moral 
agents, or human beings. 
There are at least two reasons why I call this philosophy whereby rationality is 
re-construed in terms of a personal commitment to the highest good a ‘pro-theology 
philosophy’, that is, a philosophy that by its very nature gestures towards the 
rationality of the claims of faith. One reason concerns the fact that the theory of 
knowledge proper to this philosophy presupposes and explains the vital role that faith 
plays in human reasoning. Although this faith is not specifically religious, the very 
fact that faith of any kind is indispensible to ordinary rationality already suggests that 
religious faith and even Christian faith may have a sort of rational substance that is 
often overlooked on prevailing conceptions of both reason and faith.  
While the account of knowledge developed in this work may afford some 
initial and potentially fruitful grounds for asserting the rationality of Christian faith, I 
have suggested that there may be an even more powerful and conclusive approach to 
doing this, which involves showing how faith explains the possibility of maintaining 
the individual commitment to the highest good, or moral virtue, that I have described 
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as the final arbiter of human rationality.  
In my proposal, in fact, an ‘ethical’ re-definition of rationality in terms of a 
personal commitment to the highest good ineluctably calls for a theological 
explanation as to how this commitment can be upheld. Thus, a pro-theology 
philosophy, fully enacted, is strictly speaking a theological philosophy. For this 
reason, I will proceed in the section below to illuminate pro-theology philosophy’s 
relation to theological philosophy by outlining my understanding of this final 
rendering of philosophy, which will be developed more extensively in a further 
volume.  
Though the ultimate purpose of the present work is to lay the foundation for 
the elaboration of a theological philosophy, and thereby overturn the question whether 
faith is rational, I would close my account of pro-theology philosophy by emphasizing 
its potential uses for philosophers who are not concerned with this particular question. 
As the discussion thus far will have established, pro-theology philosophy potentially 
allows for the recovery of a now uncommon way of thinking about philosophy as a 
‘way of life’xli, namely, in accord with the highest good, which predominated in many 
ancient and medieval schools and recurs under various guises in a limited number of 
more recent schools of philosophical thought.
xlii
  
This way of thinking promises not only to render philosophy more accessible 
to ordinary people but by the same token to provide them with resources urgently 
needed in today’s world for living good and meaningful lives. That aside, the attempt 
I will make to show how emphases on logic and the soundness of arguments fit within 
a larger framework for addressing moral, personal, or one might say existential 
questions about philosophy as a ‘way of life’ also holds promise in terms of 
reconciling analytic and Continental approaches to philosophy, which are often at 
odds with one another on account of a tendency to perceive these concerns as 
mutually exclusive. By reconciling those concerns under the auspices of pro-theology 
philosophy, I not only lay the groundwork for alleviating the problem of the 
rationality of faith but also potentially for innovations in philosophical methodology. 
 
The Project: Theological Philosophy 
 
The first substantial chapter of Theological Philosophy (‘Necessary 
Conditions for Theological Philosophy’) picks up where pro-theology philosophy 
leaves off, arguing that belief in the God of Christian faith—a God whose nature and 
work are treated by Christian theology—provides an explanation or rationale for 
moral virtue or human rationality, and is rational in that sense. Such an explanation is 
arguably necessary on account of the human tendency to reduce the highest good of 
‘bearing things well’ or self-actualization to lesser goods—like the promotion of a 
specific cause or institution, the pursuit of knowledge, wealth, fame, pleasure, family, 
friends, or honor, to name a few—or even to ‘goods’ that may not be good at all.  
To make this reduction is ironically to exchange an ability to utilize our lives 
and resources in ways that promote our own flourishing and that of others for one of 
using other persons, objects, and circumstances to the end of reinforcing self-serving 
interests, and ultimately, a prideful perspective on the self. It is to undermine rather 
than support the highest good and therefore compromise rationality. In order to obtain 
a rationale for refusing to jeopardize our rationality along these lines, therefore, it 
seems necessary to posit the reality of one ultimate good that cannot be reduced to 
any finite good: a single highest good that is transcendent, even divine.
xliii
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Though such an affirmation of divine unity or simplicity, such as can be found 
in the work of Aquinas to say nothing of other monotheists, suffices in many respects 
as a rationale for rationality, there is a level on which an account of the reality of a 
single transcendent being necessitates an appeal to a Trinity of divine persons, 
namely, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. An analogy derived from human knowing, 
or better, self-knowing—which presupposes the knower, the object known, which is 
the self, and the will or desire to know the object known—illustrates why this is so.  
Where this analogy is invoked, the Father may be regarded as the first knower 
who knows the Son in the way one would know oneself. Since the Father’s 
knowledge on this understanding is reflexive—it is self-knowledge—the Son in turn 
can be said to know the Father. Thus, the Father’s knowing of the Son and the Son’s 
knowing of the Father reflect their mutual desire to know one another, that is, God’s 
desire to know himself and make himself known as the highest good that he is, which 
is encapsulated by the person and work of the Holy Spirit.  
From this analogy, it follows that the doctrine of God as Father, Son, and 
Spirit is essential to accounting for one God who is capable of knowing and 
communicating himself as God and of willing to do precisely this. Since a God 
incapable in these respects could scarcely be considered worthy of the name ‘God’, 
the doctrine of the Trinity which establishes a perfect correspondence between who 
God is, what he knows, what he says, what he wants, and what he does, satisfies the 
conditions for the possibility of affirming that God is God: a being who always 
completely is what he is, which is to be and to know and to utter and to desire and to 
do all that is good. 
Although the doctrine of the Trinity upholds the doctrine of the one God, it 
remains the case that human beings are incapable of knowing God directly apart from 
his own efforts to reveal himself, on account of the fundamental incommensurability 
of transcendent and immanent, simple and complex, infinite and finite, eternal and 
temporal, beings. By thus affirming that the immediate knowledge of God lies beyond 
our cognitive reach, I do not mean to suggest that we must abandon the task of 
thinking about who God is, or to deny that we can articulate a positive or cataphatic 
theology.  
As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the unknowable nature of God 
simply stipulates that positive theological work be defined in terms of delineating 
what can be said about God for the sake of confirming that he is God, to wit, a being 
who by definition transcends human knowledge. Put differently, God’s nature 
requires that claims about him be treated as formal rather than substantial, or 
indicative of the kind of being that he is, who as yet subsists beyond our ken, as 
opposed to disclosing him as an object that might be encountered and subjected to 
direct analysis in this life.  
While such an appropriately reserved approach to the theological task allows 
us positively to articulate a great deal about God’s nature, the apophatic or negative 
theological outlook that nonetheless underlies it prevents us from defeating the whole 
purpose of theology by describing God as though he were a being that could be 
rendered intelligible on our terms, that is, an idol.  
In order to span the otherwise unbridgeable gap between humanity and God, 
the Incarnate Son of God revealed the kind of Being God is—indeed, Triune—by 
expressing his Spirit, which always operates out of a desire to make the Father known 
as the highest good and accomplish his purposes. In thus revealing the Trinity, the 
Son provided us with the fully delineated conception of the supremely transcendent or 
highest good, which we need in order to secure a rationale or motivation for 
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sustaining rationality. By adhering to the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, or to 
belief in the God of the Christian creed, thus engaging in what I call ‘Christian 
creedal reasoning’, consequently, we obtain the most robust account conceivable of 
the conditions that allow for the possibility of maintaining an orientation towards the 
highest good.
xliv
 
That is not to deny that it is possible to exercise rationality or moral virtue 
without the relevant rationale for rationality. As native speakers of a language can 
communicate relatively successfully without knowledge of grammar, so rational 
human beings may exercise moral virtue or strive for the highest good apart from 
belief in God. In much the same way that grammatical knowledge is essential to 
teaching a language or communicating in the most effective and articulate manner, 
however, a rationale for rationality is arguably constitutive of rationality, when 
rationality is defined in the fullest sense of the term. 
From this, it follows that belief in the God of Christian faith not only allows us 
fully to account for rationality but also to be rational in the most robust sense. While a 
capacity to account for rationality by appealing to key articles of Christian faith 
naturally does not substitute for efforts to be rational, nevertheless the ability to be 
rational, combined with an explanation of the conditions for the possibility of 
rationality, guarantees human rationality in its paradigmatic form.    
On my account in two subsequent chapters (‘Christian Creedal Reasoning’, 
parts I and II), the Son’s revelation of God in the form of a human person does not 
merely offer us the resources needed to explain and even sustain efforts to promote 
the highest good. It simultaneously establishes that our efforts to promote the highest 
good, facilitated by Christian creedal reasoning in light of belief in the Triune, 
Incarnate God, strictly speaking entail efforts to live by faith in the God of Christian 
creed. That is to say, they represent efforts to imitate the Son by using the abilities he 
bestowed on us through his creative work to express our human spirits to the Father’s 
glory, or in light of the knowledge of his absolute significance.  
As this suggests, the process of becoming individuals that promote the highest 
good is one and the same as the process of growth as a Christian believer, at least if it 
is understood as such.
xlv
 This contention will be bolstered through a further discussion 
of other doctrines that are the subject of Christian creedal belief, in particular, 
creation, fall, redemption, and church. Towards the end of my discussion of these 
doctrines, I extrapolate the implications of my arguments thus far for an 
understanding of the relationship between Christianity and other systems of belief. 
Far from precluding conversations amongst members of diverse religious and moral 
traditions, I demonstrate that Christian creedal reasoning holds potential to facilitate 
them. 
In developing the argument of the foregoing chapters, the next one (‘Sufficient 
Conditions for Theological Philosophy’) outlines the conditions which, when 
satisfied, ensure that we operate under the auspices of belief in the simple, Triune, and 
Incarnate God, such that our ordinary lives become convertible with our lives in God. 
These conditions are comprised of the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and 
love. On my account, the process of habituating ourselves in these virtues involves 
learning to bring the knowledge of God as the sole object of absolute significance to 
bear in knowing the immediate objects of our knowledge.  
By organizing our lives around God along these lines, we are equipped to 
unlearn our natural tendency to ascribe greater significance to ordinary circumstances 
than they deserve and to prioritize greater over lesser goods, thus bearing things well 
at all times. Though we are unable to obtain knowledge of God himself in the process, 
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we do come to understand our experiences rather differently than we might have done 
otherwise. In much the same way that the grammar of a language helps us conceive 
the meaning of a sentence, consequently, belief in God provides us with the rules for 
thinking about reality, which enable us to put the world of our experience into proper 
perspective, without over or under-estimating the worth of the things we know.
xlvi
 
The difference belief in God makes to our understanding of the world in this 
instance is the sort of indirect knowledge of him that we may presently attain, through 
the mediation of the things which are directly accessible to our understanding. 
Provided we cultivate a habit of thinking about these things in terms of the fact that 
they are ‘not God’, we may begin indirectly to experience the God who is ‘nowhere’ 
in all the ordinary circumstances of our lives until we may eventually come to sense 
his presence continuously.  
Though the theological virtues of faith and hope are the means through which 
we actually engage in such Christian creedal reasoning, I call attention in a further 
chapter (‘The Consequences of Theological Philosophy’) to the fact that the life of 
love alone furnishes proof of the orientation towards the highest good that such 
reasoning fosters. In developing this claim, I show how love creates the optimal 
conditions for cultivating the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance, which are convertible on my account with the personal, inter-personal, 
instructive, and persuasive powers of Christian love.  
On the grounds that rationality construed in terms of moral virtue—or love—
constitutes the substance of a life in God, I further argue that a life of love, led on 
account of the rationale for rationality that faith in the Triune, Incarnate God provides, 
represents the final arbiter or proof of faith’s rationality. By this account, therefore, 
the rationality of Christian faith and even of particular doctrines like Trinity and 
Incarnation is established not as the articles or divine object of faith are somehow 
rendered intelligible on the terms of human reason, let alone any modern standard of 
reason, but as belief in God, Triune and Incarnate, motivates us to be rational, in the 
way I have defined rationality in terms of intellectual and ultimately moral virtue, 
culminating in an authentic life of Christian love.  
As I will show in the course of this discussion, efforts to demonstrate love—
and thus the theological and cardinal virtues—are bound to involve difficulties and 
sufferings of various kinds, particularly in a society permeated by the sin tendencies 
that undermine the virtues. In ways I will explain, the love of God makes it possible 
to bear these otherwise unbearable sufferings well. In that sense, the proof for the 
rationality of faith that the life of Christian love affords at once provides a theodicy, 
that is, a case for the goodness of God in the face of sufferings and evil. After all, it is 
the love of a fundamentally good and loving God that makes it possible in the first 
place to bring the good of bearing things well out of experiences that could not 
objectively be described as good.  
In the concluding chapter (‘Towards a Trinitarian Philosophy’), I summarize 
the argument of the book. Subsequently, I explain how its efforts to overturn the 
question of faith’s rationality open doors for theological inquiries that are based on 
the assumption that faith is rational, including the inquiries concerning how to live by 
faith that are proper to the field of theological ethics. More specifically, I demonstrate 
how theological philosophy lays the foundation for what I call a Trinitarian 
philosophy, in which the affirmation of the Triune God that this work establishes as 
constitutive of the final rationale for human rationality is construed as the source and 
basis for all reality, human knowledge, and human life, which conversely represent 
modes of participation in the life of the Triune God.  
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As I have demonstrated, the account of the relationship between philosophy 
and theology that has been developed in this work and that such a Trinitarian 
philosophy would presuppose turns on the initial articulation of a pro-theology 
philosophy that defines rationality in terms of a personal commitment to the highest 
good, through engagement with all three of philosophy’s sub-disciplines, namely, 
ontology, the theory of knowledge, and ultimately ethics. Since an appeal to belief in 
God, Triune and Incarnate, is required to explain and even maintain this commitment, 
or rationality, I have suggested that such a philosophy is strictly speaking a 
theological philosophy.  
Although philosophy and theology are treated as distinct disciplines on this 
account, the fact that each informs and enables the purposes of the other suggests that 
a framework for understanding the inter-relationship of the two fields is necessary for 
the purpose of doing justice to the subject matter proper to each discipline, namely, 
human and spiritual life, respectively. This is the framework I begin to construct in 
the following chapters, which collectively delineate a pro-theology philosophy. 
  
